The missing link in nanomaterials governance: industrial dynamics and
  downstream policies by Rafols, Ismael et al.
 1 
 
 
The missing link in nanomaterials governance: 
industrial dynamics and downstream policies 
 
Ismael Rafols1,2, Patrick van Zwanenberg1 
Molly Morgan1, Paul Nightingale1 and Adrian Smith1 
 
1 SPRU – Science & Technology Policy Research, Freeman Centre 
University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QE, UK 
 
2
 Technology Policy & Assessment Center, School of Public Policy, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA. 
 
9th August 2009 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article we explore the analytical and policy implications of widening the governance 
of nanomaterials from the focus on risk regulation to a broader focus on the governance of 
innovation. To do this, we have analysed the impact of industrial activities on 
nanotechnology governance, while previous studies have concentrated on risk appraisal, 
public perceptions, public engagement, regulatory frameworks and related policies. We argue 
that the specific characteristics of the industrial dynamics of nanomaterials – flexibility in 
applications and distributed innovation - have important implications for innovation 
governance as they limit and enable different interventions to attempt to shape technology. 
Flexibility and distributedness exacerbate the difficulties of directly controlling or shaping 
the directions of nanomaterials innovation. In particular, the potential for public policy 
leverage is hindered by the bottom-up nature of governance resulting from the multiplicity of 
innovation sites. Under these conditions, we argue that the framing of policies for 
nanomaterials governance needs to be broadened. The prevailing emphasis on policy 
initiatives upstream, while commendable, should be complemented with broader downstream 
policies, such as renewable energy procurement or regulations in housing, in order to 
modulate technological development towards socially desirable goals. 
 
Keywords: nanotechnology; manufactured nanomaterials; innovation governance; industrial 
dynamics; enabling technology; technology assessment; public engagement.
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1. Introduction: from risk governance to innovation governance 
 
The development of nanotechnology has been accompanied by a high level of social 
awareness about the need to address public concern over health, environmental safety and the 
social implications of the new technologies. This increased awareness of the influence of 
public perceptions on innovation (following experience with genetically modified organisms) 
has led to policy efforts to promote the development of socially acceptable technologies that 
do not compromise human health or environmental safety. These efforts have resulted in a 
variety of expert committees, public engagement experiments and technology assessment 
exercises aimed at improving nanotechnology governance (e.g. RS/RAE 2004; Renn and 
Roco 2006a; SCENIHR 2007; Gavelin et al. 2008; RCEP 2008).  
 
Three main conclusions have repeatedly emerged from these efforts. First, ‘nanotechnology’ 
is a palette of disparate technologies at the nano-scale and does not necessarily constitute a 
useful category to discuss regulation or technology governance (Doubleday 2007; RCEP 
2008, p.12; Rip 2009). Second, there is major uncertainty and ignorance regarding the safety 
of many manufactured nanomaterials and, since for some nanomaterials ‘there is a plausible 
basis for concern that harmful effects might arise’, a precautionary approach is recommended 
(RCEP 2008, p. 27; Hansen et al. 2008). Third, the discussion of the risks and benefits posed 
by nanotechnologies concerns the direction and control of the innovation process and thus 
should be framed in terms of innovation governance rather than risk governance (EC 2007). 
Risk governance is preoccupied with minimising the risks of harmful effects of 
nanotechnologies – hence it is a back-end response to innovation. Innovation governance, on 
the other hand, is aimed at purposefully influencing the technological choices made so that 
innovation is directed towards socially agreed goals, such as health, well-being, social justice 
and environmental sustainability. Note that here we adopt a broad conceptualisation of 
governance, as ‘all structuring of action and interaction that has some authority and/or 
legitimacy’ whether or not these actions or interactions are intentionally aimed at governing 
or regulating (Rip 2009, p. 2). 
 
The first and second conclusions (disparity of nanotechnologies and ignorance on risks) have 
been widely discussed and we will not dwell further on them, although their uptake in policy 
is limited. In this paper we focus on the third aspect, the move from risk to innovation 
governance, which has received far less discussion and has yet to be translated successfully 
into policy. The UK’s Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) report on 
novel materials (RCEP 2008), in which the authors of this paper were indirectly involved, 1 
exemplifies that despite awareness of a broader perspective, the shift in policy beyond risk to 
innovation governance remains elusive. This RCEP report makes forceful proposals to 
address risk governance, spelling out specific measures, such as advocating for a partial 
revision of REACH2, mandatory reporting of nanomaterials manufacturing and usage and an 
early warning system. In some passages it does also discuss the challenge of governing the 
direction of emergent technologies, but when it comes to recommendations, it resorts to 
                                                 
1
 We produced a scoping study for the RCEP on Nanomaterials Innovation Systems: Their Structure, Dynamics 
and Regulation (see Nightingale et al. 2008), part of which was used in the official RCEP report (RCEP, 2008). 
Here we present a summary of the main insights of the scoping study. Readers are referred to Chapter 3 of it, 
Nightingale et al. (2008), for a presentation of the theoretical framework used, based on the innovation systems 
literature and evolutionary perspectives on science and technology.  
2
 REACH is the new European Union regulation concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
restriction of CHemicals. 
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rather general exhortations for ‘an adaptive governance regime capable of monitoring 
technologies and materials as they are developed and incorporated into processes and 
products’ (RCEP 2008, p. 8) and a recognition of ‘the importance of continual “social 
intelligence” gathering and the provision of ongoing opportunities for public and expert 
reflection and debate’ (RCEP 2008, p. 79). Its proposals serve mainly to reinforce the 
framing of policies in terms of singular risks and overlook the wider innovation dynamics. It 
does not address what a governance regime should look like, nor how, aside from preventing 
harm, policies could influence the direction of technical change and the ultimate uses of the 
technology.3  
 
Nevertheless, if not explicit in the framing of governance, in practice one can observe a 
growing concern for the direction of nanotechnology innovation. On the one hand, at a 
normative level, the discourse on responsible development of nanotechnology ‘implies a 
commitment to develop and use technology to help meet the most pressing human and 
societal needs, while making every reasonable effort to anticipate and mitigate adverse 
implications or unintended consequences’ (National Research Council 2006, p. 73). This 
remit is clearly difficult since neither the social benefits nor the risks are well understood.4 
On the other hand, in purely instrumental terms, application of nanomaterials is shifting in 
search for public acceptability. This is because public attitudes to the risks posed by 
nanomaterials (as in biotechnology) differ widely depending on their application, for 
instance, in food or health, and on the perceptions of who reaps the benefits and who bears 
the costs (RCEP 2008, p. 72; Stirling 2008). Not surprisingly under these circumstances, 
green nanotechnologies have become the new and acceptable side to ‘nano’ in contributing to 
the solution of the world’s most pressing problems such as clean water and climate change 
(Jones 2007; Schmidt 2007; Rebuffat 2008). Hence, for both normative and instrumental 
reasons, nanomaterials development is under pressure to follow particular technological 
pathways in preference to others. This means that, in reality, a de facto governance of 
technological choices is in place, orchestrated by networks of disparate actors and conflicting 
aspirations, interests and norms (Rip 2009). The political concern is that the particular 
interests of powerful actors in governance networks may result in certain technological 
developments being favoured at the expense of more ‘plural priorities’ (Stirling, 2009). 
However, it is unclear how the governance of an emergent technology might be made more 
explicit, transparent and democratic. And it is not obvious whether nanomaterials innovations 
can (or should) be purposefully directed.  
 
In the succeeding sections of this paper we present an analysis of innovation governance for 
the specific case of manufactured nanomaterials,5 with the aim of making more explicit the 
                                                 
3
 Similarly, the recent UK Government response to the RCEP report frames governance in terms of 
understanding and management of risks. Innovation and ‘the capture of economic and social benefits’ are 
regarded as separate issues, which are left mainly to industries and their exercise of corporate social 
responsibility (UK Government 2009, p. 24). In section 4 we argue that these issues are (a key) part of de facto 
governance (Rip 2009).  
4
 Given current levels of uncertainty and ignorance about the risks posed by some nanomaterials, this statement 
would suggest the adoption of a (potentially contentious) precautionary approach: the development of some 
nanomaterials would be justified only if their applications are aimed at socially relevant goals.  
5
 Hereafter the discussion is presented exclusively in terms of manufactured nanomaterials, a specific subset of 
nanotechnologies. They are among the ‘first’ generation nanotechnologies, which have reached or are about to 
reach commercialisation and thus pose the most urgent threat. This does not mean that innovation governance 
analysis for other nanotechnologies, e.g. ‘active nanotechnologies’ (‘second’ generation), is not relevant. But it 
also does not follow that our analysis can be generalised. See Doubleday (2007) for a discussion on the 
appropriate scales for framings of nanotechnologies. 
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sites of technological choice and exploring the scope for public policy intervention. Many 
previous studies of nanomaterials governance focus on risk appraisal (Renn and Roco 2006b; 
Hansen et al. 2008), public perceptions and deliberation (Kahan et al. 2009; Pidgeon et al., 
2009), soft and hard regulatory frameworks (Lee and Jose 2008; Stokes 2009) and the 
entanglement of these with policy (Macnaghten et al. 2005; Doubleday 2007). A few studies 
analyse the impact of industrial activity on risk governance, for example, in relation to life 
cycle assessment (Bauer et al. 2007; Meyer et al. 2009), but very few discuss the impact of 
industrial dynamics on the direction of technical change, i.e. in innovation governance 
(Robinson, 2009). We believe that this is a crucial missing link in our understanding of 
nanomaterials governance.  
 
In this article we argue that the specific characteristics of the industrial dynamics of 
nanomaterials have important implications for innovation governance as they limit and 
enable different interventions that attempt to shape technology. The article is organised as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the key concepts that underlie the view that the directions of 
innovation can be purposefully influenced. Section 3 argues that, since nanomaterials are 
enabling technologies, they can be used as ‘products for process innovation’ for a variety of 
applications in myriad commercial sectors – and their function and use (and meaning) can be 
re-interpreted at different points in diverging value chains. It follows that the industrial 
dynamics of nanomaterials is characterised by flexibility of applications and distributed 
innovation. These characteristics have two implications. The first, discussed in Section 4, is 
that nanomaterials development is intractable in terms of direct control, that is, towards 
specific technological targets; however, there is room for emergent, de facto governance to be 
‘modulated’ (Rip 2009). The second implication, discussed in Section 5, is that policy 
interventions to shape technological development are needed in the early technology stage, 
but not only upstream (Wilsdon and Willis 2004) and midstream (Fisher et al. 2006; Joly and 
Rip 2008) but also downstream, closer to the end-user. Section 6 provides a summary and 
concludes the article. 
 
 
2. Shaping the direction of innovation 
 
Attempts to influence the direction of innovation in novel materials are beset by the so-called 
Collingridge (1992) dilemma, which holds that we cannot control technologies once they are 
well developed because they become entrenched, thereby making them susceptible to various 
forms of ‘lock-in’ and developmental momentum in a particular direction. Once material 
investments, infrastructures, institutional commitments, routines and user habits develop 
around a particular technology, the development trajectory for the whole technological 
system becomes established and extremely difficult and costly to reverse or redirect (Dosi 
1982; Arthur 1989; Williams 2000; Shove 2003). A classic example is the QWERTY 
keyboard which was intentionally designed to be suboptimal to slow down mechanical 
typewriters, but has persisted in the age of computers (David 1985).  
 
Many have recognised this dilemma and the associated problems affecting innovation and 
technology development, and a variety of policy approaches have been proposed to try to 
address this problem of lock-in. Most focus on broadening the scope of societal 
considerations and stake-holder participation in the processes governing technology before 
irreversible commitments. Such approaches typically focus on avoiding socially undesirable 
technological configurations by garnering a wider spectrum of knowledge (see review in 
Fisher et al. 2006). Practical manifestations of this ‘opening up’ can be seen in the evolution 
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of technology assessment – initially a technocratic exercise– into ‘Constructive Technology 
Assessment’ (CTA) variants, including a broader range of participants and issues (Rip et al. 
1995), and ‘Real-Time Technology Assessment’ (RTTA)  variants that emphasise the 
interactive and reflexive efforts of stakeholders (Guston and Sarewitz 2002). In the last years, 
strategies of engagement ‘upstream’ and public deliberation have been proposed, to influence 
technology in its earliest stages, before lock-in to certain technological trajectories can occur 
(Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Wilsdon et al. 2005; Macnaghten et al. 2005; Pidgeon et al. 2008). 
More recently, the discourse on ‘responsible development of nanotechnology’, with its 
associated (non-binding) codes of conduct, appears to have emerged as the main normative 
frameworks for industry (EC 2008; Anon 2008; BASF 2009). 
 
A common theme in all these efforts is that anticipation of future effects should be integrated 
into the promotional aspects of technology development. Proponents of this view argue that 
the design of technological development should be a wider, more interactive process that 
includes a variety of societal actors as well as technical experts. The effect of opening up the 
design process will be that designers’, users’, citizens’ and policy makers’ ideas and values 
are articulated at an early stage, and should enable valuable contributions to this process and 
the opening of new areas for innovation. 
 
While these direct and explicit efforts of technology assessment and public engagement are a 
very valuable contribution to innovation governance, our analysis of innovation dynamics 
suggests that they are not sufficient to direct innovation (Nightingale et al. 2008).  
 
 
3. Industrial dynamics: flexibility in applications and distributed innovation 
 
The key issue regarding industrial dynamics is that manufactured nanomaterials are not 
consumer products that are sold to end-users, but ‘capital’ products that are incorporated into 
other products manufactured by secondary firms in a variety of industries. Products 
containing nanomaterials can be intermediary products (biosensors) or end-user products (e.g. 
nano-silver socks) whose performance is improved by the specific properties of the 
nanomaterials. In other words, nanomaterials are enabling technologies that can be 
understood as ‘products for process innovation’. This has two important implications for their 
industrial dynamics (and governance) in terms of their flexibility of application and the 
distributed nature of innovation (see the map innovation sites in Figure 1).  
 
Flexibility of application means that one type of nanomaterial can be used in a variety of 
applications that can benefit from the same special electronic, optical, catalytic, chemical or 
physical properties of the material (Aitken et al., 2006, p. 3003).6 For example, research by 
Dr Saif Haque of Imperial College London, focuses on charge transfer dynamics in 
nanostructured molecular materials with the goal of developing solar cells. However, his 
better understanding of the properties of nanocrystalline TiO2 prompted Haque to branch his 
research into chemical sensors (e.g. for security checks in airports) and light-emitting 
displays (e.g. for consumer electronics) –which have completely different social implications 
(Nightingale et al., 2008, p. 63). Flexibility of application, by definition, is characteristic of 
                                                 
6
 Interestingly, the flexibility is two way: since the same specific and special properties are provided by different 
nanomaterials, choice exists among the materials to be selected to fulfil a given function. For example, carbon 
nanotubes can be used for applications in drug delivery, photovoltaics and sensors (among others). But for the 
specific application of photovoltaics, one can use carbon nanotubes, metal oxides nanocrystals or quantum dots. 
This results in a highly dense matrix of Functions x Nanomaterials, as shown by Aitken et al. (2006, p. 3003). 
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so-called enabling or general purpose technologies (Youtie et al., 2008). As we will see, one 
of the key consequences of flexibility is that the ‘final outcomes of innovation are not 
realized until the stages of final implementation/configuration’, and may differ 
extraordinarily from the initial technological visions or promises (Williams, 2006, p. 238) 
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Figure 1. Generic actors and main linkages in nanomaterials innovation and governance networks. 
 
The distributed nature of innovation results from the long, branching value chains into which 
nanomaterials are incorporated as ‘products for process innovation’. For example, TiO2 
nanoparticles, developed in a collaboration between a university spin-off and a transnational 
chemical corporation, are bought by manufacturers of ceramic tiles or glass (because they 
provide self-cleaning properties), who sell their products to construction companies in 
multiple countries, who sell their buildings to real estate agents, who sell them on to 
households, who hire people (or do it themselves) to drill into the tiles or windows, remove 
them and generally redecorate their new homes. In these long industrial networks, innovation 
occurs at different stages along the value chain7  – innovation results not only from the 
synthesis of new nanomaterials (e.g. single wall carbon nanotubes - SWCNTs), but also from 
new production processes (e.g. use of new catalysts for SWCNTs production), new 
incorporations of well-known nanomaterials in existing products (e.g. SWCNTs in paper or 
plastics), new methods of incorporating nanomaterials into products (e.g. ink jet printing of 
SWCNT), or - more rarely - new end-user products made possible by the properties of 
                                                 
7
 Robinson (2009, pp.7-8) proposes a richer description of the value chain in terms of an ‘innovation chain’ that 
constitutes a ‘mosaic of arenas of innovation and selection’. 
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nanomaterials (e.g. fully recyclable electronic newspapers enabled by the SWCNT printable 
memory).8  
 
In each of the branching ‘junctures’ of the value-chain, a given nanomaterial (such as 
SWCNTs) is subject to multiple pressures and constraints that push, pull and shape its 
development in certain directions. These influences include the scientific and technical 
paradigms and routines that frame researchers’ thinking (Dosi, 1982); dedicated 
infrastructures that make substitution with alternatives difficult (Jacobsson and Johnson, 
2000); practices that enjoy greater economies of scale and positive network externalities 
(Arthur, 1989); prevailing social attitudes (Shove, 2003); dominant policies, legal 
frameworks and professional association lobbying (Walker, 2000); hegemonic discourses that 
inform socially acceptable performance criteria.9 Hence, at every stage in the value chain - 
up-, mid- and downstream, these various factors lead to specific commitments that might 
result in different types of lock-in: to the particular nanomaterials used;10  to the type of 
energy or labour required for their production infrastructures; to the possibilities for the 
product to be recycled; to the types of applications favoured; and so on. 
 
 
4. Accepting lack of control: de facto governance  
 
Given these conditions of distributed innovation and flexibility in applications, is it actually 
possible to govern the development of a technology? Some technologies have emerged under 
relatively controlled environments, where the number of innovating, manufacturing and 
commercialising companies and other stakeholders is comparatively small and easy to 
identify. In these cases, one can imagine the possibility of purposefully directing innovation 
towards specific outcomes via policy interventions that anticipate alternative applications. 
This might be typical of relatively bounded systems, such as specific energy (e.g. fuel cells) 
or sanitation (e.g. membrane) technologies, which have well-defined societal functions, or 
even in generic applications very specifically framed (e.g. ‘lab-on-a-chip for cell analysis’, 
Robinson and Propp, 2008). However, in the case of nanomaterials, with an overwhelming 
multiplicity of innovation sites and actors (distributed innovation) and wide diversity of 
outcome options and societal functions (flexibility of application), our knowledge is too 
incomplete and the web of interactions too complex to assume that efforts to ‘control’ the 
directions of technology will succeed in driving innovation towards the desired options. 
 
A first response to the perceived intractability of nanomaterials to governance is to reduce the 
incompleteness of our knowledge. There have been numerous calls for a step increase in the 
funding for medical and environmental toxicology, and regulatory frameworks (RS/RAE 
2004; RCEP 2008; Stokes 2009) in a bid to address the lack of knowledge related to risk 
issues. 11 Efforts have also been made to increase our understanding of public perceptions, 
regulations, preferred technological choices and the policy discourses shaping them, often 
from a risk governance perspective (Kahan et al. 2009; Pidgeon et al. 2009; Stokes 2009; 
Doubleday 2007). However, with the exception of a few studies in the area of environment, 
                                                 
8
 This example is based on media coverage of the report by Song et al. (2008) on inkjet printing using SWCNTs.  
9
 E.g., Doubleday (2007) and Robinson (2009) argue that there is lock-in in the policy discourse: the framing of 
nanomaterials governance is focused narrowly on health, environment and safety issues. 
10
 E.g. recent investments in large plants for the production of specific nanomaterials, such as TiO2  or CNTs, 
may already be leading to lock-in. 
11
 Although these same voices acknowledge that even with massive toxicology research, reaching some 
scientific understanding will take decades – certainly much longer than the time for commercialisation. 
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little work has been done on industrial dynamics or nanomaterials value chains (Schmit 2008; 
Meyer et al. 2009, Robinson, 2009).12 This lack of research, compounded by the secrecy in 
nanomaterials trade between manufacturing and user firms, has resulted in a worrying dearth 
of information on the scale and scope of nanomaterials applications (Maynard and Rejeski 
2009). For example, the only public database of nanotech-enabled products is based on 
information from firms’ web sites (PEN 2009) and estimates by private consultants on 
nanomaterials markets differ by orders of magnitude (Meyer et al. 2008). Hence, more 
empirical research on the industrial dynamics and life cycle assessment of nanomaterials is 
needed urgently given the failure of self-reporting schemes (DEFRA 2008) and reluctance 
(so-far) of most countries to opt for mandatory reporting (UK Government 2009, pp. 19-22). 
 
However, even if our knowledge of nanomaterials risks, benefits, uses and social preferences 
were massively boosted, the would-be governance actors would still find the task of 
controlling and purposefully making choices aimed at specific outcomes overwhelming. This 
is because, in this case, the combined properties of distributed innovation and flexibility 
exacerbate the multiplicity of actors, complementary technologies and linkages involved in 
developing or using nanomaterials. Historical examples of other emergent technologies 
displaying similar properties, such as chemicals, information and communication technology 
(ICT) and biotechnology,13 provide vivid illustrations of the sheer unpredictability of social 
outcomes, and challenge the assumption that collective action can purposefully shape 
technological directions (Williams 2006). Yet accepting the incapacity to exert control over 
the specific outcomes of nanomaterials, does not negate the possibility of modulating their 
development more broadly towards generic goals. However, it does entail adopting a 
different understanding of what governance constitutes, and where and how it operates, 
which has policy implications. 
 
In stating that the development of nanomaterials depends on the interactions among multiple 
actors, and is not amenable to purposeful top-down control, we are implying that the 
governance of this system is bottom-up and distributed. Arie Rip (2009) introduced the 
notion of de facto governance to describe such a situation. This notion offers two key 
insights. First, that governance is in place even in the absence of intentional efforts to 
regulate, control or shape the technology because the existing socio-technical networks both 
enable and constrain future technological developments. Second, that policies aimed at 
shaping technologies have to emerge from and act within a given configuration of de facto 
governance, that is, that ‘attempts at regulation can be located as interventions in emerging de 
facto governance, and will depend on it for their effectiveness’ (Rip 2009, p.1 ). 
 
A variety of activities, such as the discourse on responsible development of nanotechnology 
and its associated corporate codes, expert committees in the International Organization for 
Standards, OECD working parties, etc., have been presented as examples of the emergence of 
a distributed governance for nanomaterials (RCEP 2008; Rip 2009). If we broaden the scope 
from risk governance to innovation governance – given our interest in technological choice - 
and adopt a de facto governance perspective, it follows logically that not just soft law and 
associated social arenas, but also a variety of structuring institutions and sites need to be 
                                                 
12
 Research has been conducted on the industrial dynamics of nanotechnology in sociology and economics, but 
it focuses on the conditions for ‘success’ for public researchers, firms or clusters on the basis of bibliometric and 
patent analyses. In our view, this body of work has produced only limited insights relevant to considerations of 
directionality in innovation. 
13
 Note that all these technologies have the characteristics of general purpose technologies, i.e., pervasiveness, 
innovation spawning, and scope for improvement (Youtie et al., 2008). 
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taken into account. A map of the actors playing roles in innovation helps to identify these 
sites (see Figure 1 in this piece, and Figure 2 in Robinson 2009. p.10). This makes it possible 
to begin to see how ‘distributed innovation and distributed governance merge into one 
another’ (Rip 2008, p. 18). For governments willing to foster certain social applications it is 
easier to try to act in those areas such as public research, funding and regulatory agencies that 
are under their direct control.14 However, it should be emphasised that the core of these 
innovation networks is configured by the various industrial actors, which consequently play a 
central role in de facto governance. In summary, a de facto governance perspective highlights 
the crucial role played not just by research and development (R&D), and firms manufacturing 
nanomaterials, but also by the firms making nano-enabled products and other actors such as 
the insurers, retailers and end-users. This is why the industrial dynamics is such an important 
site for setting directionality. But, given this strong bottom-up and diffuse nature of 
governance, what is the room left for policy action to influence technological choices? 
 
  
5. Policies to shape direction: There is plenty of room ‘downstream’ 
 
We argue that there is room for policy action to shape the directions of nanomaterials 
innovation, but that the scope of policies needs to be broadened in two respects. First, 
governance considerations should widen from the current focus upstream to downstream. 
Second, promotion and prevention instruments should be interwoven in the policy 
framework. 
 
Upstream vs downstream policies 
The distributed nature of both innovation and de facto governance challenges the view that 
policies aiming at the shaping of technologies should focus on interventions ‘upstream’. In 
the UK, ambitions to steer nanotechnology innovation in socially-desired directions in the 
most recent years have been reflected in the widespread support for public engagement 
‘upstream’, in the R&D process (Wilsdon and Willis, 2004; Macnaghten et al., 2005; Pidgeon 
et al., 2008). The proponents of public engagement (at least the academic social scientists) 
initially used the term ‘upstream’ to refer to the ‘early stages’ of a technology, that is, before 
the establishment of irreversible commitments, at “a point where research trajectories are still 
open and undetermined” (Wilsdon et al., 2005, p. 38). However, the notions of ‘upstream’ 
and ‘downstream’ have not always been clearly defined15 and are frequently conflated in 
policy practice with the use of upstream in the terminology of industrial value chain analysis 
(which pre-dated the ‘engagement’ usage). Within the value-chain terminology downstream 
refers to those stages closer to the end-user (left-hand side of Figure 1), and upstream to those 
that lie far from the consumer (right-hand side of Figure 1). This is the meaning we adopt 
here – reserving ‘early stage’ to refer to the phase before technological lock-in.  
 
Within the so-called linear model of innovation, which assumes a directional flow of 
knowledge from science to technology to society, it was easy for non-experts to conflate 
‘upstream’ and ‘early-stage’ as referring to the same phase, that is, the phase when the 
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 E.g., since 2008 the UK Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC) has had programmes 
(Grand Challenges) devoted to the application of nanotechnologies in Energy, Healthcare and the Environment. 
15
 One exception is Fisher et al. (2006), for whom ‘upstream’ is associated with research policy, ‘midstream’ 
with R&D practice and ‘downstream’ with commercial and/or social applications and regulation: ‘Upstream 
decisions may be characterized as determining what research to authorize, midstream decisions as determining 
how to implement R&D agendas, and downstream decisions as determining whether to adopt developed 
technologies’ (Fisher, 2006, p. 490). Note that this use is slightly different from ours. 
 10 
technologies are initially developed in the R&D process. However, the linear model has been 
widely discredited by many historical studies – most technologies are developed and shaped 
throughout the value chaing, in interactions downstream (e.g. between users and 
manufacturing firms), as well as midstream (between firms and finance) and ‘usptream’ 
(between firms and researchers). Indeed, the description in Section 3 of how innovation 
occurs at numerous loci in the value chain, in no predetermined order, implies that that the 
concepts of ‘early stage’ and ‘upstream’ should not be confused. The directions of 
nanomaterials and nano-enabled-products are shaped at the up-, mid-, and downstream sites – 
and policy intervention (and deliberative practices) may be required ‘early-stage’ - but in all 
these sites in order to modulate de facto governance.  
 
Promotional vs prevention policies 
The governance of technologies traditionally has been split into promotional policies that 
support research, mainly upstream, and regulation policies aimed at avoiding harm for the 
end-user, that is downstream (Fisher et al. 2005). A move from risk to innovation governance 
clearly demands that we overcome the antagonistic distinction between promotion and 
prevention. Promotion of certain technological pathways prevents the development of others. 
Prevention via regulation of given technologies indirectly promotes alternatives. The erosion 
of this distinction is already underway particularly in the area of risk. Under the aegis of the 
precautionary approach enshrined in EU legislation, risk governance has broadened risk 
appraisal processes to a wider variety of sites and social actors, including end-users (at the 
most downstream) as well as researchers and policy makers (upstream). Calls for early 
warning systems respond to this logic (RCEP, 2008). The analysis developed in the previous 
two sections suggests that a reciprocal move is also necessary: in order to influence direction, 
technology promotional policies are needed upstream but also mid- and downstream. 
 
An analysis of the UK’s promotional policies for nanomaterials reveals a strong focus on 
upstream, that is, the left-hand side of Figure 1: funding for basic and applied research; 
investment for shared facilities and infrastructures; and grants for university-industry 
collaboration. Yet we found no policies targeted at shaping direction or intervening 
downstream, where value-chains and markets unfold. This finding suggests there is room for 
promotional policies intervention downstream. However, the associated unpredictable 
dynamics of distributed innovation means that many of the policies downstream cannot be 
geared to the achievement of specific outcomes for nanomaterials. Instead policies 
downstream need to address generic frameworks that will have a modulating effect on the 
development of nanomaterials. This is because policies mid- and downstream (and sometimes 
upstream), need to perform certain social functions (transportation, energy provision, health), 
without being specific about the technologies that can provide them.  
 
For example, let us explore the policies that could have an effect on the development of 
nanomaterials for photovoltaic technologies for sustainable development in commercial 
sectors such as energy or housing. Given the distributed nature of innovation, the policy 
measures span both sides of Figure 1 –some are specific to nanomaterials, some are specific 
to energy or housing, some are generic - either up- or downstream. Policies specific to 
nanomaterials, mainly up- and midstream, would include metrology equipment, toxicology 
studies, clearing-houses to facilitate awareness and knowledge flows among universities, 
manufacturing firms and potential user-firm – which, as argued above, constitute the current 
policy focus. Also, and equally relevant, would be policies specific to renewable 
technologies, such as: 
• targeted research funding for both public and private R&D; 
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• the conduct of extended foresight or technology assessment exercises;  
• grants to invest in the production capacity required to produce photovoltaics; 
• public procurement (e.g. street lighting or government buildings) to encourage the 
formation of markets; 
• clearing-houses to facilitate awareness and knowledge flows between manufacturing 
firms and potential user-firms; 
• targeted regulations, such as a requirement for the incorporation of renewable 
energies into certain kinds of future housing stock.  
 
In addition, it would be important for these policies to be aligned to generic sustainability 
policies and pressures within the ‘user’ sectors (far right-hand side of Figure 1), specific to 
the energy or housing sectors. This would include, for example, general regulatory 
environments that encourage investment in renewable technologies, or fiscal policies 
designed to provide the same incentives to individual households wishing to invest in 
photovoltaics (Kemp and Pontoglio, 2008).  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
This article has explored the analytical and policy implications of moving beyond a policy 
focus on the governance of risks of manufactured nanomaterials to a focus on the governance 
of innovation. To do this we analysed the industrial dynamics of nanomaterials, while 
previous studies on nanotechnology governance had concentrated on risk appraisal, public 
perceptions, public engagement, regulatory frameworks and related policies. We have argued 
that nanomaterials are ‘products for process innovation’, that is enabling technologies that 
can be used to improve product performance for a variety of applications in myriad 
commercial sectors in diverging value chains. The ensuing characteristics of the industrial 
dynamics of nanomaterials – flexibility in application and distributed innovation – have two 
important implications for our understanding of how public policy might affect innovation 
governance. First, since nanomaterials governance has a strong bottom-up nature and is 
generally intractable in terms of direct control, policy efforts should emphasise the 
modulation of technologies towards desirable social functions rather than the achievement of 
specific technologies. Second, in order to succeed, policies aimed at such modulation need to 
be implemented at a variety of socio-economic sites.  This means that policy initiatives 
upstream make valuable contributions to innovation governance, but they are not sufficient to 
direct innovation. They need to be complemented by downstream policies such a 
procurement or targeted regulations. In summary, the analysis of industrial dynamics 
suggests that a broader understanding of innovation and a richer palette of policies are 
required if the public policy is to move beyond preventing risk to shaping the social outcomes 
of nanomaterials development. 
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